Proxinvest

Founded in 1995, Proxinvest is an independent proxy firm supporting the engagement and proxy analysis processes of investors. Proxinvest mission is to analyse corporate governance practices and resolutions proposed at general meetings of listed firms.

Proxinvest main services are :

  • ​Proxy reports
  • Definition and monitoring of client customized voting guidelines
  • Corporate Governance Data and Rating
  • Thematic research
  • Engagement support

Proxinvest has been a pioneer and champion of good corporate governance and has grown into a recognised expert in the field.

Proxinvest is independently-owned and only works for investors : Proxinvest does not provide consulting services to the companies it covers, mitigating related risks to its clients and ensuring the independence of our analysis. As a result Proxinvest is able to take a robust, independent, engaged and unconflicted view of the companies in which our clients invest.

As Managing Partner of Expert Corprate Governance Service Ltd (ECGS), Proxinvest has built a large network of corporate governance experts to support clients in corporate governance analysis worldwide. 

Jehanne Leroy
  • Jehanne Leroy

Nokia - Assemblée Générale des actionnaires du 8 avril 2021

Le 1er aout 2020, Pekka Lundmark a remplacé Rajeev Suri en tant que Directeur général. Nous recommandons l’opposition au rapport de rémunération (résolution 10) en raison des préoccupations suivantes :- Utilisation du résultat opérationnel non-IFRS comme indicateur de performance alors que le rapport annuel indique l'utilisation du " résultat opérationnel " (trompeur).- Indemnité de départ de 5,12 millions d'euros pour l'ancien Directeur général, M. Suri, .excessive - Absence de justification d...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A. - AGM 08 April 2021

In item 4, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy for the Corporate Bodies. Overall remuneration amounts are reasonable, but we have serious concerns over the variable remuneration structure:- it exclusively depends on annual results, without a clear alignment with long-term interests of shareholders,- the percentage of annual bonus depending on qualitative assessments (50%) is above our voting policy limit of 20%,- individual weightings of quantitative KPIs are not...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Anima Holding - AGM 31 March 2021

In item 2.i, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy. All the performance criteria used to calculate variable remuneration are disclosed and long-term targets are quantified, but we regret that the criteria used to calculate the annual bonus are too generically disclosed. Furthermore, in our opinion the discretionary power of the Board to define the final bonus is excessive (40% of the bonus depends on qualitative assessments, plus the power to increase/decrease the ...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Nokia - AGM 08 April 2021

On 1 August 2020, Pekka Lundmark replaced Rajeev Suri as President and CEO of Nokia. We recommend to oppose the remuneration report (item 10) due to the following concerns: • Use of non-IFRS operating profit as performance indicator while the annual report indicates the use of “operating profit” (misleading)• Excessive termination package of €5.12 M for previous CEO, Mr Suri• Lack of justification of the new CEO’s golden Hello• CEO’s total remuneration of €8.02 M (excluding golden hello) exceed...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Beiersdorf - AGM 01 April 2021

General: The AGM is to be held in the form of a virtual AGM in accordance with the German Law to Mitigate the Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The physical presence of shareholders or their authorised proxies is not possible. The voting rights may therefore be exercised solely by postal vote or by granting authority to the proxies designated by the Company. Item 4: We recommend to oppose the discharge of the Supervisory Board due to our concerns over the determination of a separate target...

Jehanne Leroy
  • Jehanne Leroy

Nokia - Assemblée Générale des actionnaires du 8 avril 2021

Le 1er aout 2020, Pekka Lundmark a remplacé Rajeev Suri en tant que Directeur général. Nous recommandons l’opposition au rapport de rémunération (résolution 10) en raison des préoccupations suivantes :- Utilisation du résultat opérationnel non-IFRS comme indicateur de performance alors que le rapport annuel indique l'utilisation du " résultat opérationnel " (trompeur).- Indemnité de départ de 5,12 millions d'euros pour l'ancien Directeur général, M. Suri, .excessive - Absence de justification d...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A. - AGM 08 April 2021

In item 4, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy for the Corporate Bodies. Overall remuneration amounts are reasonable, but we have serious concerns over the variable remuneration structure:- it exclusively depends on annual results, without a clear alignment with long-term interests of shareholders,- the percentage of annual bonus depending on qualitative assessments (50%) is above our voting policy limit of 20%,- individual weightings of quantitative KPIs are not...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Anima Holding - AGM 31 March 2021

In item 2.i, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy. All the performance criteria used to calculate variable remuneration are disclosed and long-term targets are quantified, but we regret that the criteria used to calculate the annual bonus are too generically disclosed. Furthermore, in our opinion the discretionary power of the Board to define the final bonus is excessive (40% of the bonus depends on qualitative assessments, plus the power to increase/decrease the ...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Nokia - AGM 08 April 2021

On 1 August 2020, Pekka Lundmark replaced Rajeev Suri as President and CEO of Nokia. We recommend to oppose the remuneration report (item 10) due to the following concerns: • Use of non-IFRS operating profit as performance indicator while the annual report indicates the use of “operating profit” (misleading)• Excessive termination package of €5.12 M for previous CEO, Mr Suri• Lack of justification of the new CEO’s golden Hello• CEO’s total remuneration of €8.02 M (excluding golden hello) exceed...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Beiersdorf - AGM 01 April 2021

General: The AGM is to be held in the form of a virtual AGM in accordance with the German Law to Mitigate the Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The physical presence of shareholders or their authorised proxies is not possible. The voting rights may therefore be exercised solely by postal vote or by granting authority to the proxies designated by the Company. Item 4: We recommend to oppose the discharge of the Supervisory Board due to our concerns over the determination of a separate target...

Jehanne Leroy
  • Jehanne Leroy

Nokia - Assemblée Générale des actionnaires du 8 avril 2021

Le 1er aout 2020, Pekka Lundmark a remplacé Rajeev Suri en tant que Directeur général. Nous recommandons l’opposition au rapport de rémunération (résolution 10) en raison des préoccupations suivantes :- Utilisation du résultat opérationnel non-IFRS comme indicateur de performance alors que le rapport annuel indique l'utilisation du " résultat opérationnel " (trompeur).- Indemnité de départ de 5,12 millions d'euros pour l'ancien Directeur général, M. Suri, .excessive - Absence de justification d...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Jerónimo Martins, SGPS, S.A. - AGM 08 April 2021

In item 4, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy for the Corporate Bodies. Overall remuneration amounts are reasonable, but we have serious concerns over the variable remuneration structure:- it exclusively depends on annual results, without a clear alignment with long-term interests of shareholders,- the percentage of annual bonus depending on qualitative assessments (50%) is above our voting policy limit of 20%,- individual weightings of quantitative KPIs are not...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Anima Holding - AGM 31 March 2021

In item 2.i, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy. All the performance criteria used to calculate variable remuneration are disclosed and long-term targets are quantified, but we regret that the criteria used to calculate the annual bonus are too generically disclosed. Furthermore, in our opinion the discretionary power of the Board to define the final bonus is excessive (40% of the bonus depends on qualitative assessments, plus the power to increase/decrease the ...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Nokia - AGM 08 April 2021

On 1 August 2020, Pekka Lundmark replaced Rajeev Suri as President and CEO of Nokia. We recommend to oppose the remuneration report (item 10) due to the following concerns: • Use of non-IFRS operating profit as performance indicator while the annual report indicates the use of “operating profit” (misleading)• Excessive termination package of €5.12 M for previous CEO, Mr Suri• Lack of justification of the new CEO’s golden Hello• CEO’s total remuneration of €8.02 M (excluding golden hello) exceed...

Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)
  • Expert Corporate Governance Service (ECGS)

Beiersdorf - AGM 01 April 2021

General: The AGM is to be held in the form of a virtual AGM in accordance with the German Law to Mitigate the Consequences of the COVID-19 Pandemic. The physical presence of shareholders or their authorised proxies is not possible. The voting rights may therefore be exercised solely by postal vote or by granting authority to the proxies designated by the Company. Item 4: We recommend to oppose the discharge of the Supervisory Board due to our concerns over the determination of a separate target...

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