In item 4, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy for the Corporate Bodies. Overall remuneration amounts are reasonable, but we have serious concerns over the variable remuneration structure:
- it exclusively depends on annual results, without a clear alignment with long-term interests of shareholders,
- the percentage of annual bonus depending on qualitative assessments (50%) is above our voting policy limit of 20%,
- individual weightings of quantitative KPIs are not disclosed,
- the CEO's annual bonus is capped at 200% of his base salary, which is above our voting policy limit of 150%.
For all the above-mentioned concerns, we recommend shareholders to OPPOSE.
Jeronimo Martins S.G.P.S. is a holding company. Through its subsidiaries, Co. is engaged as a food distribution company with operations in Poland and Portugal. Co. operates in four segments: Portugal Retail, which comprises the business unit of JMR - Gestao de Empresas de Retalho, SGPS, S.A. (Pingo Doce supermarkets); Portugal Cash & Carry, which includes the wholesale business unit Recheio; Poland Retail, which includes the business unit with the brand Biedronka; and Others, which includes marketing services and representations, restaurants in Portugal, health and beauty retail in Poland, and its retail business in Colombia.
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JERONIMO MARTINS (PT), a company active in the Food Retailers & Wholesalers industry, is favoured by a more supportive environment. The independent financial analyst theScreener has confirmed the fundamental rating of the title, which shows 4 out of 4 stars, as well as its unchanged, defensive market behaviour. The title leverages a more favourable environment and raises its general evaluation to Positive. As of the analysis date April 23, 2021, the closing price was EUR 14.19 and its potential was estimated at EUR 15.64.
HEADLINES: • Benefit Systems: a year to regain condition (BUY - transfer of coverage) • Turkey Strategy: drought risk - view on potential implications • Magnit: FY20 sales up 11.9% yoy, vs. our 12.0% forecast NEUTRAL • Jeronimo Martins: 4Q sales up 2.4%, vs. flattish expectations POSITIVE • CCC: takeaways from the management videoconference NEUTRAL • Moscow Exchange: solid equities and derivatives volumes in December, client balances up as well POSITIVE • Cyfrowy Polsat: announces new 5G mobile tariffs POSITIVE
Le 1er aout 2020, Pekka Lundmark a remplacé Rajeev Suri en tant que Directeur général. Nous recommandons l’opposition au rapport de rémunération (résolution 10) en raison des préoccupations suivantes :- Utilisation du résultat opérationnel non-IFRS comme indicateur de performance alors que le rapport annuel indique l'utilisation du " résultat opérationnel " (trompeur).- Indemnité de départ de 5,12 millions d'euros pour l'ancien Directeur général, M. Suri, .excessive - Absence de justification du golden Hello du nouveau Directeur général- Rémunération totale du Directeur général de 8,02 M€ (ho...
In item 2.i, shareholders are called to a binding vote on the remuneration policy. All the performance criteria used to calculate variable remuneration are disclosed and long-term targets are quantified, but we regret that the criteria used to calculate the annual bonus are too generically disclosed. Furthermore, in our opinion the discretionary power of the Board to define the final bonus is excessive (40% of the bonus depends on qualitative assessments, plus the power to increase/decrease the final payment by 50% of the fixed remuneration). In addition, the CEO's variable remuneration is cap...
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