A surge in the quantity of money in OECD countries: What has not turned out as expected?

The quantity of central bank money (the monetary base, liquidity) has increased considerably in OECD countries since 2008. This economic policy choice normally lead s to: A marked fall in risk-free long-term interest rates: this has happened; A squeezing of risk premia on risky bonds: this has happened; Inflation: it has not risen; Asset price bubbles: we have seen them in real estate, but not in equities; Rapid credit growth: this has not happened; A surge in corporate investment or in housing: this has not happened; A fall in the household savings rate, which has not happened. The anomalies are therefore that there has been : No reaction by inflation, due the decline in employees' bargaining power; No rise in share prices, due to the surge in the risk premium on equities; No rapid increase in credit, for several reasons: the lack of external borrowing requirement for companies; the rise in the corporate risk premium; No increase in corporate investment, due to the rise in the corporate risk premium; No increase in housing investment, given the saturation of needs; No fall in the household savings rate, due to the income effect (the fall in the interest rates compensated by an increase in savings). The anomalies in the OECD economy’s reaction to the strong growth in the monetary base are therefore dangerous, but explainable.