Are OECD economies really different after the COVID crisis?

Among the most commonly cited structural changes to have taken place in OECD economies since the COVID crisis, some have actually happened , while others have not really. Companies still have strong bargaining power relative to wage earners, as shown by the continued skewing of income distribution in favour of earnings. Corporate governance has therefore not shifted in favour of wage earners; The labour supply and therefore the labour force (participation) has fallen, which c ould have raised wage earners’ bargaining power, although it seems that this fall is being corrected; The widely heralded industrial reshoring and deglobalisation are not taking place: on the contrary, the sharp increase in demand for goods has increased imports from emerging countries; Inflationary pressures have certainly increased, due to the shift in the structure of demand from services to goods and the scarcity of commodities (energy, metals) brought about by the energy transition; The digitalisation of the economy has certainly accelerated, but its effect on productivity and long-term growth remains uncertain; If the energy transition is taking place at a faster pace, the sooner its effects will appear on prices, employment, investment and inequality. But it is not very clear that the transition is accelerating ; Last, governments and central banks are playing a much more important role in mitigat ing the effects of the crisis and defin ing the long-term parameters for economies (strategic industries, energy transition, support for employment). If economic policy conservatism has not disappeared entirely , it has at least receded considerably.