At least in theory, Xi Jinping’s “common prosperity” makes sense for OECD countries too

When we read Xi Jinping’s texts describing the co mponents of “common prosperity” (a concept revived from Mao ’s era ), we find the following general guidelines: Avoid polarisation between rich and poor and the collapse of the middle class; grow the size of the middle-income cohort ( “ olive-shaped ” model of income distribution); Correct the negative effects of the technological revolution on income distribution, but not by using welfare policies or, it seems, tax policy; rather, by making primary income distribution more equal by skewing income distribution more towards labour and away from capital; Combat monopolies and unjustified increases in asset prices; combat the private use of data; Develop private donations and private financing of social welfare to reduce income disparities; Demand the rich lead a “discrete life” at the same time as saying it is normal to get rich through work. W ithout going into how the Chinese government intends to achieve these goals, one has to admit that this concept of common prosperity makes sense and highlights the present turmoil of capitalism.