China’s Eastern Mediterranean ambitions: a challenge to Europe’s strategic autonomy

The Eastern Mediterranean is rapidly emerging as a site where the interests of global powers intersect. China’s economic and strategic footprint in this region is expanding at a pace that demands the attention of European policymakers, not just because of European trade and investment interests in the region, but because of the challenge China’s activity poses to European strategic autonomy.The Eastern Mediterranean is a diverse group of countries: EU members Greece and Cyprus, Western-aligned Israel, Turkey, an emerging middle power, and countries of the Global South such as Egypt, Libya, Syria and Lebanon. China can test and refine its strategies, building relationships tailored to each country’s needs and vulnerabilities. By engaging with both EU and non-EU states, China is positioning itself as a flexible, pragmatic partner – one that is not bound by the same political or normative constraints as EU countries.The region is crossed by China’s 21st century Maritime Silk Road, a key artery of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Eastern Mediterranean is a natural entry point into the European market for China. Europe remains a crucial destination for Chinese exports, particularly as successive US administrations have sought to limit Chinese imports.  Furthermore, for China, a strong presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is a foothold that can be leveraged for broader geopolitical influence.The China-Egypt relationship exemplifies the varied and comprehensive nature of Chinese support. Egypt has received significant Chinese infrastructure and real estate investment for the construction of its new administrative capital. China has also been investing in the Suez Canal Economic Zone,  making it a hub for Chinese companies and a symbol of deepening Sino-Egyptian ties. On energy, China has plans for a major wind farm in Egypt and a $6.75 billion green hydrogen and ammonia plant aimed at exporting to European markets. Chinese automakers are setting up electric vehicle factories in Egypt.More generally, Chinese companies are helping Egypt expand its energy capacity, with an eye to exporting surplus electricity to Europe. This not only deepens Egypt’s economic ties with China but also creates new channels for Chinese influence to reach European markets. Discussions between Egypt and Greece about a high-voltage electricity link underscore the growing interconnectedness of the region – and the potential for China to shape energy flows into Europe.Finally, the China-Egypt relationship has acquired a military dimension: Egypt is reportedly considering the purchase of advanced Chinese fighter jets and has already deployed Chinese missile systems. Joint military exercises took place in April.Turkey-China relations fundamentally differ from China's relations with other Eastern Mediterranean countries, particularly in terms of economic influence. Turkey maintains a more balanced and autonomous relationship with China, as it aims to remain strategically flexible and avoid dependency on any single power. It has demonstrated its independence by imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, a move it executed quickly and decisively to protect its domestic industries, even if it challenged Chinese economic interests. The diplomatic friction created by the treatment of Uyghurs in China, further illustrates that while economic ties exist, the relationship is not without its limits or points of contention.At the same time, Turkey is open to selective cooperation with China, particularly in areas that align with its own development goals or strategic interests. This includes being part of the BRI, which has helped with the modernisation of Turkish railways and port infrastructure.China’s rise in the Eastern Mediterranean is a microcosm of its global strategy: pragmatic, flexible and increasingly comprehensive. Partner countries’ experiences are mixed. On the one hand, Chinese investment fills infrastructure gaps. On the other, countries are becoming increasingly economically dependent on China and, in some cases, increasing their security dependence on the country, as in the case of Egypt. Turkey is the most notable exception, at least in relative terms. China’s increasing presence in the Eastern Mediterranean may hurt Europe’s strategic autonomy and its ability to defend its interests in an era of great power competition. This is a reprint. This article has been published as part of Bruegel Zhonghua Mundus Newsletters within the EU Project China. (Original Link).Related Podcast: China's presence in the Eastern Mediterranean