Does Germany have a credible threat?

The German stance on the euro zone’s economic policy is now quite clear: Fiscal policy can be very expansionary during a crisis, but it will then have to be restrictive to reduce the public debt ratio; If part of the debt is mutualised at the European level, it will be in the form of loans to countries , which will then have to be repaid; The ECB must maintain an inflation target and must not monetise public debt with the objective of helping countries raise financing; it can buy only a limited part of the public debt, and it must buy the different countries’ bonds according to their proportion of its capital key, without overweighting the troubled countries. This view is clear: there should be no "fiscal dominance" (the central bank is forced to use monetary policy to ensure countries’ fiscal solvency) and it is fiscal policies and not monetary policy that ensure countries’ solvency. But what will happen if the majority of euro-zone countries supported by the European Court of Justice chooses to implement a fiscal dominance policy? In reality, Germany has no credible threat to impose its views. It cannot take the risk of triggering another public debt crisis in the peripheral countries, given the loss of growth that this would entail for Germany; it cannot leave the euro, given the massive appreciation of its exchange rate this would lead to. The ECB will therefore be able to practice "fiscal dominance" even if Germany opposes it.