Does the euro zone need Germany’s and the Netherlands’ external surpluses to shrink? How?

It is often claimed that Germany’s and the Netherlands’ huge external surpluses are a threat to the stability of the euro zone. Why? Is this the case? When Germany and the Netherlands lent to the other euro-zone countries, these other countries accumulat ed excessive external debt . This led to the euro-zone crisis. Germany’s and the Netherlands’ external surpluses were therefore destabilising during this period and should have been corrected (through faster wage growth in Germany and the Netherlands); Since the euro-zone crisis, Germany and the Netherlands have lent to the rest of the world outside the euro zone, and the other euro-zone countries have eliminated their external deficits. This equilibrium is also unfavourable, since Germany’s and the Netherlands’ savings are not financing growth in the euro zone. But the problem is not Germany’s and the Netherlands’ external surpluses, but how they are used; A favourable equilibrium would therefore be one where Germany and the Netherlands lent their savings surpluses to the other euro-zone countries, but this time to finance efficient investments in these countries ( which was not the case before the euro-zone crisis), increasing their supply capacity, enabling them to export more and over time rebalancing foreign trade between these countries on the one hand and Germany and the Netherlands on the other thanks to a more favourable allocation of capital for the other euro-zone countries.