Have OECD countries jumped from a deflationary equilibrium to an inflationary one?

Before the COVID crisis, there was talk of deflationary risk in OECD countries; now, there is talk of inflationary risk. Has there been a major change in the functioning of OECD economies that would explain a shift from a deflationary to an inflationary equilibrium? The deflationary risk emanated from a decline in domestic demand such that, despite the sharp decline in real interest rates, the savings rate had risen more than the investment rate. This situation can be explained by the skewing of income distribution against wage earners. To break out of the deflationary equilibrium, the national savings rate in OECD countries would therefore now have to fall, which could happen if: Either fiscal deficits increased sharply, more so than the private sector savings rate; Or income distribution shifted in favour of wage earners, increasing the overall propensity to consume. What we are seeing today is that neither of these developments that would move the OECD to an inflationary regime has happened.