How is it possible to avoid multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations on public debt?

In general, there are multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations when it comes to public debt. If the probability of government debt restructuring expected by lenders is high, government bond yields will rise and the public debt dynamics will make a restructuring necessary. As long as lenders do not expect a restructuring, interest rates will remain low and a restructuring will not be necessary. Governments are therefore constantly under the threat of a change in expectations that would make a restructuring necessary. There are several ways to avoid this situation of multiple equilibria with self-fulfilling expectations: By not allowing a public debt restructuring, but this has other drawbacks (appearance of an obvious moral hazard); By avoiding anything that weakens government solvency, for example debt structuring; Governments themselves implement a configuration (low public debt ratio, limited to the primary fiscal deficit even in the event of recession) where the multiple equilibrium disappears and where there is only a single equilibrium without debt restructuring.