How to prevent crisis responses from causing the next crisis?

After the 2000-2001 recession, linked mainly to the bursting of the stock market bubble, monetary policies in OECD countries became expansionary. In particular, they did not react at all to rising private sector debt and real estate prices. When monetary policy belatedly became a little less expansionary, the real estate bubble burst and the subprime crisis ensued. After the subprime crisis, fiscal and monetary policies stayed expansionary and have become extremely so in response to the COVID crisis. This economic polic y bias will continue. It has enabled the increase in public debt, an upturn in private borrowing and a very sharp rise in asset prices (equities, real estate, corporate valuations). Today, even a cautious exit from the expansionary monetary policies is likely to trigger a debt crisis and a fall in asset prices, resulting in an even more drastic financial crisis than the subprime crisis. Repeatedly, the economic policies introduced in response to a crisis, especially monetary policies, have therefore set in motion the next crisis. To avoid this, policymakers would have to dare return to countercyclical economic policies, that is policies which become neutral or restrictive again in growth periods.