Is there a difference between public debt monetisation and short-term treasury financing?

In almost all countries, the central bank belongs to the government and pays its profits to the government: it therefore makes sense to consider a consolidated balance sheet of the government and the central bank. We compare the two options that arise when a government then runs a fiscal deficit: Monetise the fiscal deficit, i.e. in practice have the central bank buy the bonds issued by the government. When we look at the consolidated central bank and government balance sheet, we then see in its liabilities an increase in banks’ reserves at the central bank; The treasury issues bills, i.e. very short-term debt securities. In both cases, there is monetary financing of the fiscal deficit in the short term, the cost of which then depends on the level of short-term interest rates. But there is a difference between these two forms of short-term financing: In the case of issuance of treasury bills, the treasury has to convince private investors to hold them, which may drive up the short-term interest rates on these bills; In the case of monetisation of the fiscal deficit, the central bank has to convince banks to hold reserves whose interest rate is administered; and other savers to hold non-interest-bearing money . A t equilibrium, this drives down long-term interest rates so as to increase demand for monetary assets with exogenous interest rates.