Must aid to euro-zone countries in difficulty be preceded by a public debt restructuring?

In theory, if a euro-zone country in difficulty asks to borrow from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), then the sustainability of its debt must be examined (by the Eurogroup) and , if it is not sustainable, then its debt must be restructured. The objective is clear: To prevent moral hazard ( to no longer provide full insurance against sovereign default risk); To prevent “vulture” funds, sheltered by this insurance, from making speculative gains on the government bonds of euro-zone countries in difficulty. But it has to be admitted that introducing a risk of public debt restructuring in the euro zone may : Lead to even greater segmentation between the core and the peripheral countries; P ut even more pressure on the ECB if it wants to maintain the integrity of the euro zone “whatever it takes” ; T rigger a jump to a negative equilibrium with a loss of fiscal solvency, since there are always self-fulfilling expectations and multiple equilibria when it comes to public debt .