What if central banks have been on the wrong path since the early 1980s?

Since the early 1980s, central banks have based their action on the theory of credibility (after the prominent work of Barro and Gordon). According to this theory, central banks should stabilise medium-term inflation expectations (they are deemed credible if they succeed in doing so). This prevents an economic equilibrium with pointless (actual and expected) inflation that does not lead to an increase in production (a fall in unemployment). The disinflation observed in OECD countries since the 1980s is then attributed to central banks gaining credibility (obtained by switching to a more restrictive monetary policy as soon as expected or future inflation rises, also known as inflation targeting). But perhaps this analysis that has underpinned central banks’ behaviour since the 1980s is completely wrong : Studies have showed that expected long-term inflation has no effect on actual inflation in the medium or long term. This invalidates the theory of credibility; The disinflation would then be due not to central banks obtaining anti-inflationary credibility, but to a change in wage formation due to wage earner s’ declining bargaining power.