What will become of the euro zone’s fiscal and monetary rules?

In the euro zone’s early years, fiscal and monetary rules were clear: A fiscal deficit cannot exceed 3% of GDP. Since 2012, there has been the rule of a maximum level of 0.5% of GDP for the structural fiscal deficit and the rule requiring a return to a public debt ratio of maximum 60% of GDP in 20 years if this level is exceeded; Monetary policy aims to achieve inflation of less than 2%, but close to 2% (this was clarified in 2003), and it is not possible to monetise fiscal deficits. But the recent practice of euro-zone economic policy has eliminated these rules, since we are now seeing: Fiscal deficits considerably higher than 3% of GDP and public debt ratios considerably higher than 60% of GDP, which it will be impossible to reduce to 60% in 20 years; Massive monetisation of fiscal deficits with very rapid money supply growth. So there is currently a fiscal dominance regime: the ECB is forced to ensure that the countries are fiscally solvent. In addition, the need for public spending and public investment is clearly very great for the future. What can we imagine for the future? There is no way the old rules can be reinstated; A fiscal dominance regime can be maintained ; An attempt can be made to define new effective rules, for example: The possibility of having a very high cyclical fiscal deficit and monetising it; A ban on monetisation of structural fiscal deficits; The possibility of financing only efficient public investments with public debt.