Can France, Germany, Spain and Italy share the same currency given their divergent behaviours and social choices?
Asymmetric shocks are highly damaging in a currency area, since there is only one monetary policy. But these shocks can be corrected with fiscal policy. The structural asymmetries that result from diverg ent behaviours among economic agents and social choices , meanwhile, are extremely dangerous in a currency area when they lead to different desirable levels for interest rates and exchange rate s . T his is the case between France, Germany, Spain and Italy, given their divergent : S avings behaviours on the part of the public and private sectors (accumulation of assets or debt), which ought to result in different real exchange rates; B ehaviours when it comes to debt and the formation of real estate prices, which ought to result in different interest rates; D egrees of labour market flexibility and wage formation, which ought to result in different nominal exchange rates; D esired levels of social welfare and therefore corporate tax burdens, which irrevocably skew cost competitiveness.